We study the problem of discrete distribution testing in the two-party setting. For example, in the standard closeness testing problem, Alice and Bob each have t samples from, respectively, distributions a and b over [n], and they need to test whether a = b or a, b are -far (in the 1 distance) for some fixed > 0. This is in contrast to the well-studied one-party case, where the tester has unrestricted access to samples of both distributions, for which optimal bounds are known for a number of variations. Despite being a natural constraint in applications, the two-party setting has evaded attention so far.
• Communication: we show how to gain communication efficiency as we have more samples, beyond the information-theoretic bound on t. Furthermore, the gain is polynomially better than what one may obtain by adapting one-party algorithms. For the closeness testing, our protocol has communication s =Θ n 2 /t 2 as long as t is at least the information-theoretic minimum number of samples. For the independence testing over domain [n] × [m], where n ≥ m, we obtain s =Õ (n 2 m/t 2 + nm/t + √ m).
• Lower bounds: we prove tightness of our trade-off for the closeness testing, as well as that the independence testing requires tight Ω( √ m) communication for unbounded number of samples. These lower bounds are of independent interest as, to the best of our knowledge, these are the first 2-party communication lower bounds for testing problems, where the inputs represent a set of i.i.d. samples.
• Security: we define the concept of secure distribution testing and argue that it must leak at least some minimal information when the promise is not satisfied. We then provide secure versions of the above protocols with an overhead that is only polynomial in the security parameter.
1 Introduction
Our Contributions
In this paper, we initiate the study of testing problems in the two-party model, and design protocols which are both communication-efficient and secure. We do so for two basic problems on pairs of distributions (i.e., where the two-party setting is natural): 1) closeness testing, and 2) independence testing. Our main finding is that, once the number of samples exceeds the information-theoretic minimum, we can obtain protocols with polynomially smaller communication than the naïve adaptation of existing algorithms. We complement our protocols with lower bounds on the communication complexity of such problems that are near-optimal for closeness testing, as well as for independence in an intriguing parameter regime. Our upper and lower bounds on communication are novel even without any security considerations.
To argue security, we also put forth a definition for secure distribution testing in the multi-party model. Our definition differs from the standard secure computation setting due to two unique features of the considered setting. First, this is "testing" and not "computing"; second, the function of interest is defined with respect to distributions, but the inputs that the parties use in the computation are samples. These features do not come into play if the distributions satisfy the promise (e.g., they are either identical or -far), in which case the security guarantee matches the standard cryptographic one (no information is leaked beyond the output). However, the crux is when the promise is not satisfied, in which case we need to allow for some information on the parties' samples to be leaked by the protocol. Our definition permits leakage of at most one bit in this case, and leaks nothing when the promise is satisfied. See the formal definition and discussion in Section 5.
Closeness Testing. In the 2-party closeness testing problem 2pCT n,t, , Alice and Bob each have access to t samples from some distributions respectively a, b over alphabet [n] . Their goal is to distinguish between a = b and a − b 1 ≥ with probability ≥ 2/3.
We first give a non-secure near-optimal communication protocol, and then show how to make it secure with only a small overhead (polynomial in the security parameter). Our secure version is based on the existence of a PRG that stretches from polylog(m) bits to m bits, and of an OT protocol with polylog communication. We elaborate on these standard cryptographic assumptions in a later section. Overall, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem (Closeness, Secure; see Theorem 5.4). Fix a security parameter k > 1. Fix n > 1 and ∈ (0, 2), and let t be such that t ≥ C · k · max n 2/3 · −4/3 , √ n · −2 for some (universal) constant C > 0. Then, assuming PRG and OT as above, there exists a secure distribution testing protocol for 2pCT n,t, which usesÕ k n 2 t 2 4 + 1 communication.
To contrast the communication bounds of our protocol to the classic 1-party setting, consider what happens in the extreme settings of the parameters s, t, for a fixed . When t ≈ Θ(n 2/3 ), the communication isÕ(n 2/3 ) as well, i.e., Alice may as well just send all the samples over to Bob. However the communication decreases as the players have more samples. This may not be surprising given the testing results with unequal number of samples [BV15, DK16] : indeed, Alice can send ≈ max{n/ √ t, √ n} samples to Bob, and Bob can run the tester. In contrast, our protocol obtains a polynomially smaller complexity, ≈ n 2 /t 2 , whenever t n 2/3 . Intuitively, considering the extreme of t n, we can obtain near-constant communication: with so many samples, we can learn the distribution, and then use sketching tools, such as the 1 sketching algorithm of [AMS99, Ind06] .
We prove a near-tight lower bound on the above communication complexity trade-off (even without security considerations) in Section 4. We note that this lower bound differs from standard communication complexity lower bounds as the players' inputs are i.i.d. samples and not worst-case.
Theorem (Closeness lower bound; see Theorem 4.1). Any two-way communication protocol for 2pCT n,t,1/2 requires s =Ω n 2 t 2 communication.
Independence Testing. The second problem we consider is the independence testing problem in the 2-party model, denoted 2pIT n,m,t, . Let p = (a, b) be some joint distribution over [n] × [m], where n ≥ m, and for i ∈ [t], let ζ i be a sample drawn from p. Now we provide Alice with the first coordinates of ζ i 's and Bob with the second coordinates. Alice and Bob's goal is to test whether p is a product distribution or -far from any product distribution. We prove the following:
Theorem (Independence, Secure; see Theorem 6.1). Fix a security parameter k > 1. Fix ∈ (0, 2), 1 ≤ m ≤ n, and let t be such that t ≥ C · k · n 2/3 m 1/3 −4/3 + √ nm/ 2 , for some (universal) constant C, and assuming OT, there is a secure distribution testing protocol for 2pIT n,m,t, usingÕ k n 2 ·m for estimating the 2 norm of a probability distribution a given t samples presented as a stream. They show a trade-off between space s and number of samples t ≥ √ n of s · t =Õ (n). They also show this is tight under a likely conjecture on the space complexity of estimating frequency moments in the random order streaming model.
For the independence problem, two variants were studied in the streaming model in [IM08, BO10] . In the first variant, termed centralized model, we stream over pairs ζ = (x, y), which implicitly define a joint distribution (a, b), and need to compute the distance between the joint distribution and the product-ofthe-marginals distribution. Space complexity of this version is (log n) O(1) [BO10] . The second variant, termed distributed model, is more similar to ours: we stream over items (t, i, p), where t is the time (index) of a sample (x t , y t ) ∼ (a, b) and i ∈ [n] is either x t (if p = 1) or y t (if p = 2), and the goal is again to estimate the distance between (a, b) and product distribution. For the latter problem, [IM08] show the complexity is between Ω(n) andÕ (n 2 ).
In the context of connections between communication complexity and property testing, we also mention the work of [BBM12, BCG16] . They use communication tools to prove lower bounds on the sample complexity of testing problems. Their techniques however do not readily apply to proving communication complexity of (distribution) testing problems as we do here.
Testing and learning in distributed and streaming models. Communication lower bounds are also often related to those in the streaming and distributed models, which have received recent focus in the context of testing and learning questions. In particular, streaming (as a memory constraint) was considered as early as in [Cov69, HC70] , for distribution (hypothesis) testing of one distribution. In recent years, a lot of attention has been drawn to streaming (memory) lower bounds for learning problems, such as parity learning [Raz16, Raz17, KRT17, MM17, GRT18] . These results also show a trade-off between number of samples and space complexity.
Another recent avenue is to study such problems in the distributed model, where there are many symmetric players, each with a number of i.i.d. samples from the same distribution. For learning problems (e.g., parameter or density estimation), see, e.g., [BGM + 16, DGL + 17, DS18]. We note that since learning is a much harder problem, typically proving lower bounds is easier (e.g., as shown in [DGL + 17], merely communicating the output requires Ω(n) communication). In contrast, for testing problems, the output is just one bit. For testing problems, see the recent (independent) manuscript [ACT18] , who studies testing of one distribution, and focuses on reducing the communication per sample (from a max of O(log n)).
None of the lower bounds from the above papers seem to be relevant here as they become vacuous for a 2-party setting. Indeed, when two players have two set of samples from the same distribution, then purely doubling the sample set of a player trivializes the question (she can solve it without communication).
Secure approximations. Our results on secure distribution testing can also be seen in the context of the area of secure computation of approximations. This is a framework introduced by [FIM + 06], allowing to combine the benefits of approximation algorithms and secure computation. This was considered in different settings [FIM + 06, HKKN01, BCNW08, IW06, BHN09, IMSW09, KMSZ08], but the most relevant to us is private approximation of distance between two input vectors. In particular, for 2 distance, Alice and Bob each have a vector a, b ∈ R n and want to estimate a − b 2 , without revealing any information that does not follow from the 2 distance itself. For this problem, [IW06] show that secure protocols are possible with only poly-logarithmic communication complexity. They also specifically look into the private near-neighbor problem and its approximation. We use some of their techniques in our secure protocols.
Approximation and testing have a similar flavor in that they both trade accuracy for efficiency, in different ways (computing an estimate of the solution in the former case, and computing the correct output bit if the promise is satisfied in the latter). The security goals are also similar (prevent leakage beyond the intended output). One important difference is that the intended output in secure testing is just the single bit of whether or not the test passed. Thus, for example, when approximating a distance function, even a secure protocol can leak any information that follows from the distance. In contrast, when testing for closeness, if the inputs are either identical or far, the protocol may only reveal this fact, but no other information about what the distance is.
Security and privacy of testing. While we are not aware of any work on secure testing, several recent papers address differentially-private distribution testing [DHS15, CDK17, ASZ17, ADR17]. Here the privacy guarantee relates to the value of the output after the computation is concluded, requiring it to be differentially-private with respect to the inputs. Our notion of security for distribution testing is different, in the same way that secure computation is different from differentially private computation. While differential privacy (DP) is concerned with what the intended output may leak about the inputs (even if the input came from a single party or the computation is done by a trusted curator), secure 2-party computation is concerned with how to compute an intended output without leaking any information beyond what the output itself reveals. The difference in goals also results in the difference that DP testing privacy guarantees are typically statistical in nature and provide a non-negligible adversarial advantage, while secure testing protocols rely on cryptographic assumptions and provide negligible advantage.
More recently, a more stringent model of Locally Differentially Private Testing was proposed [She18, ACFT18] . This model provides a stronger notion of differential privacy, where users send noisy samples to an untrusted curator, and the goal is to allow the curator to test the distribution of user inputs (for some property) without learning "too much" about the individual samples. For LDP, the main goal is to optimize the sample complexity as a function of the privacy guarantees. While this notion of privacy also incorporates some privacy of the individual inputs, it is much closer to DP than to our security notion. In addition, both DP and LDP do not provide sub-linear communication (in the sample size, as we achieve here). In fact, their goal is to allow O(1) communication per sample, with minimal sample overhead. In contrast, our protocols provide security "nearly for free" while allowing for faster communication with more samples. Finally, in the case of independence testing, our work assumes samples are distributed between the parties who need to test the joint distribution, while in the aforementioned work, each data point contains full sample information.
We also mention the work of [MNS11] on sketching in adversarial environments, which considers another threat model: here the two parties performing the computation are honest (and trust each other), but their (large) input arrives in a streaming fashion chosen adversarially, and they may only maintain a sketch of the inputs.
Our Techniques
We now outline the techniques used to establish our main results. Since our overall contribution is painting a big picture of the 2-party complexity of distribution testing problems, we appeal to a number of diverse tools. First, we design communication-efficient protocols whose communication improves as we have more samples. Second, we show that some of the established trade-offs are near-optimal by proving communication complexity lower bounds on the considered problems, which are near-tight in some of the parameter regimes. Third, we show how to transform our protocols into secure protocols, under standard cryptographic assumptions, without further loss in efficiency. All three of these contributions are independently first-of-a-kind, to the best of our knowledge.
Communication-efficient protocols. We start by noting that we can reduce the testing problem under the 1 distance (total variation distance) to the same problem under the 2 distance, using now-standard methods of [DK16, CDVV14] . Although this reduction introduces a few complications to deal with, our main challenge is actually testing under the 2 distance.
Closeness testing (2pCT) is technically the simpler problem, but it already illustrates some phenom-ena, in particular, how to leverage a larger number of samples to improve communication. To estimate the 2 distance between the 2 unknown distributions, we compute the 2 distance approximation between the given samples of these distributions. In order to approximate the latter in the 2-party setting, we use the 2 sketching tools [AMS99] . The crux is to show that we can tolerate a cruder 2 approximation if we are given a larger sample size. Since the complexity of (1 + α)-approximating the 2 distance is Θ(1/α 2 ), we obtain an improvement in communication that is quadratic in the number of samples. Independence Testing (2pIT) is more challenging since any distance approximation would need to be established based on the distribution(s) implicitly defined via the joint samples, split between Alice and Bob, and hence our approximation techniques above is not sufficient. Instead, we develop a reduction from a large, [n] × [m], alphabet problem, to a smaller alphabet problem, which can be efficiently solved by communicating fewer samples. This is accomplished by sampling a rectangle of the joint alphabet, and showing that such a process, when combined with the split-set technique from [DK16] , generates sub-distributions (defined later) which satisfy some nice properties. We then show one can test the original distribution p = (a, b) over a "large" domain of size , where l = Θ (n 3 m/t 3 + n 2 m/t 2 + 1). We show it is possible for Alice and Bob to simulate joint samples fromp and q using O(1) communication per sample, after they have down-sampled letters from one of the marginals.
The trade-off on communication-vs-samples emerges from two compounding effects: 1) balancing the size of the target rectangle with the expected number of available samples over such rectangle; and 2) the additional advantage from a tighter bound on the 2 norm ofq. Each of the above independently generates linear improvement in communication with more samples. The latter advantage, however, is helpful only while t = O(n), and therefore we benefit from quadratic improvement in that regime, and linear improvement thereafter.
Lower bounds on communication. We note that the lower bounds on communication of testing problems present a particular technical challenge: for testing problems, the inputs are i.i.d. samples from some distributions. This is more akin to the average-case complexity setup, as opposed to "worst case" complexity as is standard for communication complexity lower bounds.
We manage to prove such testing lower bounds for the Closeness Testing problem (2pCT). While our lower bound is, at its core, a reduction from some "hard 2-party communication problem", our main contribution is dealing with the above challenge. One may observe that a "hard 2-party communication problem" is hard under a certain input distribution (by Yao's minimax theorem), and hence a reduction algorithm would also produce a hard distribution on the inputs to our problem. However, apriori, it is hard to ensure that the resulting input distribution resembles anything like a set of samples from distributions a, b. For example, the inputs may have statistical quirks that actually depend on whether it is a "close" or " -far" instance, which a reduction is not able to generate without knowing the output. Indeed, this is the major technical challenge to overcome in our reduction.
At a high level, the role of the "hard problem" is played by a variant of the well-known two-way Gap Hamming Distance (GHD) problem [CR12, She12] . The known GHD lower-bound variants are insufficient for us precisely because of the above challenge-we need a better control over the actual hard distribution, and in particular, for the a = b instance, we need the GHD input vectors to be at some fixed distance. Therefore, we study the following Exact GHD variant: given x, y ∈ {0, 1} n , with x 1 = y 1 = n/2, distinguish between x − y 1 = n/2 versus x − y 1 ∈ [n/2 + β, n/2 + 2β]. We show there exists some β ∈ [Ω( √ n), O( √ n log n)] for which communication complexity must beΩ(n), by adapting the proof of [She12] . We note that such a lower bound is far from apparent even in the 1-way communication model (in contrast to the standard GHD, whose 1-way lower bound follows immediately from the Indexing problem).
Using one instance of Exact GHD, our reduction performs a careful embedding of this hard instance into the samples from distributions a, b, while patching the set of samples to look like i.i.d. samples from the two distributions. While we don't manage to get the output of the reduction to look precisely like i.i.d. samples from a, b, our reduction produces two sets of size Poi(t) whose distribution is within a small statistical distance from the distribution of two set of samples that would be drawn from two distributions a and b which are either "equal" (when x − y 1 = n/2) or "far" (when x − y 1 ∈ [n/2 + β, n/2 + 2β]). We note that an immediate corollary of our lower bound is an alternative proof thatΩ(n 2/3 ) samples are necessary to solve closeness testing (in the vanilla testing setting), albeit the resulting bound is off by polylogarithmic factors from the best known ones [CDVV14, DK16] .
For Independence testing (2pIT), we focus on the lower bound for unbounded number of samples, which is a bit simpler to deal with as it becomes a "worst-case problem" (worst-case input joint distributions (a, b)). We are able to show such a hardness result under one-way communication only. Our Ω( √ m) lower bound uses the Boolean Hidden Hypermatching (BHH) problem [VY11] . From a single BHH hard instance, we generate an unbounded number of sample pairs (A i , B i ), where the samples are drawn from some joint distribution p = (a, b). Depending on the BHH instance, p is either exactly product or far from product distribution.
We conjecture that our entire trade-off for the Independence problem is tight. The proof of this conjecture would have to overcome the above challenge of lower bounds for statistical inputs, for finite t.
Securing the communication protocols. Once low-communication insecure protocols have been designed, one may try to convert the protocols to secure ones using generic cryptographic techniques. The latter includes various techniques for secure two-party computation ( [Yao82] and followup work), fully homomorphic encryption ( [Gen09] and followup work), or homomorphic secret sharing ( [BGI16, BGI17] ). However, a naïve application of such techniques will blow up the communication bounds to be at least linear in the input size (which is prohibitive in our context), as well as possibly requiring strong assumptions, a high computation complexity, or not being applicable to arbitrary computations. The constraint of low-overhead, combined with other considerations, requires design of custom secure protocols.
Our starting point is a technique that falls into the latter category: secure circuits with ROM [NN01], a technique that can transform an insecure 2-party protocol to a secure one with a minimal blow-up in communication, and uses a weak assumption only (OT). In order to obtain an efficient protocol, however, it only applies to computations expressible via a very small circuit, whose size is proportional to the target communication, with access to a larger read-only-memory (ROM) table. Thus, the main challenge becomes to design two-party testing protocols that fit this required format.
For Closeness Testing (2pCT), we begin with our low-communication non-secure protocol, and adapt it to be secure by designing a small circuit. One of the main difficulties in designing such a circuit is that, in the 1 -to 2 -testing reduction, Alice and Bob need to agree on an alphabet, which depends on their inputs, without compromising the inputs themselves. To bypass this, and other issues, we allow Alice and Bob to perform some off-line work and prepare some polynomial-size inputs (in ROM). First, we devise a method for Alice and Bob to generate a combined split set S (discussed later) by having each of Alice and Bob contribute sampled letters to S. Second, we securely approximate the 2 distance of Alice and Bob's original, un-splitted samples using techniques from [IW06] . Finally, we adjust our approximation by accounting for some small number of letters which differ from the original alphabet or which cannot be approximated efficiently. To allow for such adjustment to be easily accessible by a bounded-size circuit, Alice and Bob prepare inputs for all possible scenarios. The main focus of our analysis goes into proving our construction adds only poly-logarithmic factors in communication over the non-secure protocol. Our adapted secure algorithm turns out to deviate significantly from the simpler, non-secure 2pCT algorithm; hence we present the two protocols separately.
For Independence Testing (2pIT), the main challenge is in designing the communication-efficient (insecure) protocol, while adapting it to a secure one is somewhat simpler. One challenge is to securely accomplish the aforementioned alphabet reduction (as the randomness, together with the final output, might compromise Bob's input). We address this issue by having the entire process of sampling a subdistribution and pairing of samples to be done over a secure circuit. The sampled alphabet, however, might be too large to communicate, and to overcome this obstacle, we devise a method for sampling from the non-empty letters of Alice in a way that is distributed as if we would be sampling directly over the entire alphabet. For this problem, the insecure and secure protocol are more similar, and therefore we directly describe the secure version.
Preliminaries
Notation. Throughout this paper we denote distributions in small letters, and distribution samples in capital letters. Unless stated otherwise, any distribution is on alphabet [n], and domain elements of [n] are addressed as letters. In addition, whenever discussing secure protocols, we denote distributions as a, b, and for generic settings as p, q. Similarly, secure vectors of distribution samples are denoted as A, B while generic ones are denoted as X, Y . We also denote any multiplicative error arising from approximation as 1 + α, and any error or distance of/between distributions as . Unless stated otherwise, distance and norms are referring to the Euclidean distance and 2 norms.
Split Distributions. We use the concept of split distributions from [DK16] to essentially reduce testing under 1 distance to testing under 2 distance. Definition 2.1. Given a probability distribution p on [n] and a multiset S of items from [n], define the split distribution p S on [n + |S|] as follows. For i ∈ [n], let a i be equal to 1 plus the number of occurrences of i in S; note that n i=1 a i = n + |S|. We associate the elements of [n + |S|] to elements of the set E = {(i, j) : i ∈ [n], 1 ≤ j ≤ a i }. Now the distribution p S has support E and a random draw (i, j) from p S is sampled by picking i randomly from p and j uniformly at random from [a i ].
Recall from [DK16] that split distributions are used to upper bound the 2 norm of an underlying distribution while maintaining its 1 distance to other distributions:
. Let p and q be probability distributions on [n], and S a given multiset of [n]. Then
• We can simulate a sample from p S or q S by taking a single sample from p or q, respectively.
We provide further preliminaries needed for the secure versions of our protocols in Section 5.1.
Closeness Testing: Communication-Efficient Protocol
In this section we consider the closeness testing problem 2pCT, focusing first on the 2-party communication complexity only. In Section 5, we modify the protocol to make it secure.
As mentioned in the introduction, one way to obtain a protocol is to use unequal-size closeness testing, where Alice has s samples and Bob has t samples: Alice just sends her s samples to Bob, and Bob invokes a standard algorithm for closeness testing. Using the optimal bounds from, say, [DK16] , we get the following trade-off for fixed : s =Õ(n/ √ t), with the condition that s, t ≥ √ n. Here we obtain a polynomially smaller communication complexity, s =Õ (n 2 /t 2 ), whenever t is above the information-theoretic minimum on the number of samples. In Section 4, we show a nearly-matching lower bound.
Tool: approximation via occurrence vectors
Our protocol uses the framework introduced in [DK16] , allowing us to focus on the 2 testing problem. For 2 testing, we show that, for two discrete distributions p, q, we can approximate their 2 distance by approximating the 2 distance of their respective sample occurrence vectors, defined as follows.
Definition 3.1. Given t samples of some distribution p over [n], we define the occurrence vector X ∈ [t] n such that X i represent the number of occurrences of element i ∈ [n] in the sample set.
The following lemma bounds how well we need to estimate the 2 distance between occurrence vectors in order to distinguish between p = q vs. p − q 1 ≥ . Overall it shows that the more samples we have, the less accurate the 2 estimation needs to be. Using the framework from [DK16] , for now it is enough to assume that the 2 norm of both p and q is bounded by U < 1.
where X, Y represent the occurrence vectors of t samples drawn from p, q respectively, then, using ∆, it is possible to distinguish whether p = q versus p − q 1 > with 0.8 probability.
The actual distinguishing algorithm is simple: for fixed α = Ω(U ), we merely compare ∆ to some fixed threshold τ (fixed in the proof below). The intuition is that for a given number of samples, we have some gap between the range of possible distances X − Y 2 2 for each of the cases. If the number of samples is close to the information-theoretic minimum [CDVV14] , then the gap is minimal and we need to calculate almost exactly the distance, hence approximating the distance between occurrence vectors doesn't help. However, as the number t of samples increases, so does gap between the ranges, and we can afford a looser distance approximation.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Given t = O(U/ 2 ) samples from each p, q, according to [CDVV14, Proposition 3 .1], the estimator
is a max{ , p − q 2 /8} additive approximation of p − q 2 with 0.9 probability. Setting = /8 √ n, we get that:
Suppose ∆ is such that
and if p − q 1 > , then p − q 2 > / √ n and hence
We distinguish the two cases, by comparing ∆ to τ = 2 t 2 2n + 2t: namely p = q iff ∆ ≤ τ . Hence we just need to ensure that t(
Hence we need that
. Since t = O(U n −2 ), the conclusion follows.
Communication vs number of samples
We now provide a (non-secure) protocol for 2pCT with a trade-off between communication and number of samples.
Theorem 3.3 (Closeness, insecure). Fix n > 1 and ≤ 2. There exists some constant C > 0 such that for all t ≥ C · max n 2/3 · −4/3 , √ n · −2 , the problem 2pCT n,t, can be solved usingÕ n 2 t 2 4 + 1 bits of communication.
The protocol uses Lemma 3.2 as the main algorithmic tool and proceeds as follows. Bob generates multi-set S using samples from b and sends S to Alice. Then, Alice and Bob each simulates samples from a S and b S respectively, and they together approximate the 2 difference of the resulting occurrence vectors using sketching methods [AMS99] .
Non-Secure 2pCT(a, b, t) Alice's input: t samples from a Bob's input: t samples from b
2. Bob generates multi-set S using P oi( 7. If ∆ is less than τ = 2 t 2 2n + 2t output "SAME", and, otherwise, output " -FAR".
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We note that, according to Lemma 2.3, E[ b S 2 2 ] = t 2 4 /n 2 and hence b S 2 2 = O(t 2 4 /n 2 ) with at least 90% probability. Furthermore, since t = Ω( √ n/ 2 ), we have that |S| = O(n) with high probability. From now on, we condition on these two events.
If a S 2 = Θ( b S 2 ) then distributions are different and we output " -far" is step 5. Otherwise, we have that a S We now analyze the communication used by the protocol:
1. communicating S takes |S| log n =Õ(n 2 /t 2 4 ) bits with high probability.
2. estimating ∆ up to approximation 1 + α takesÕ(1/α 2 ) =Õ(n 2 /t 2 4 ) bits, using standard 2 estimation algorithms [AMS99, KOR00].
Remark 3.4. Another application of this protocol is that it can be simulated by a single party to obtain space-bound steaming algorithm with the same space/sample trade-offs. While we are not formalizing this argument in this paper, this can essentially be done by storing S and sketching A S − B S 2 2 .
Closeness Testing: Communication Lower Bounds
We now prove that the protocol for 2pCT from Section 3 is near-tight, showing the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. Let a, b be some distributions over alphabet [n] , where Alice and Bob each receive Poi(t) samples from a, b respectively, for t ≤ n/ log c n for some large enough c > 1. Then any (two-way) communication protocol Π that distinguishes between a = b and a − b 1 ≥ 1/2 requires s =Ω(n 2 /t 2 ) communication.
Intuitively, our proof formalizes the concept that in testing distributions for closeness, "collisions is all that matters", even in the communication model. This is similar to the intuition from the "canonical tester" from [Val11] , which shows a similar principle when all the samples are accessible. Our result can be seen to extending it to saying that the canonical tester is still the best even if we have more-thanstrictly-necessary number of samples that we could potentially compress in a communication protocol.
To prove the theorem, we rely on the following communication complexity lower bound, which is a variant of the GapHamming lower bound [CR12, She12] . A somewhat surprising aspect of this GapHamming variant is that, unlike for the standard GapHamming, we are not aware of a lower bound for one-way communication that would be simpler than the two-way proof from the lemma below.
Lemma 4.2. Let n ≥ 1 be even. There exists some β = β(n) ∈ [Θ( √ n), Θ( √ n log n)], satisfying the following. Consider a two-way communication protocol A that, with probability at least 0.9, for x, y ∈ {0, 1} n with x 1 = y 1 = n/2, can distinguish between the case when x − y 1 = n/2 versus x − y 1 − n/2 ∈ [β, 2β]. Then A must exchange at least Ω( n log n·log log n·log log log n ) bits of communication.
The proof of this lemma is presented in Appendix A. Now the idea is to reduce an instance of the GapHamming input from Lemma 4.2 to an instance of closeness testing by carefully molding the input (x, y) into a couple of related occurrence vectors (A, B).We use the following estimate on the statistical distance between Multinomial and Poisson random variables. Definition 4.3. Consider n, k ≥ 1, as well as a vector p ∈ R k + , where
. . M k ) = Mult -0 (n; p) be the k-dimensional random variable obtained by drawing a Multinomial random variable with parameters n and probability vector (1 − k i=1 p i , p), and dropping the first coordinate. Fix d = n/10 and l = C · t · log n (where C is some constant that we shall fix later), which have the following meaning: each distribution a, b has half mass over [d] items uniformly (called dense items), and the other half on [l] items uniformly (called large items). When a = b, these are the same items, and when a = b, the large items are the same while the dense items have supports with a large difference. In particular, the dense items are supported on sets S A , S B respectively, with |S A | = |S B | = d, and
We also set k = Θ(log n), which should be thought of as an upper bound on the count of any fixed item (with high probability).
The algorithm constructs the occurrence vectors A, B iteratively as follows. We note that all random variables are chosen using shared randomness. Let m c = m/4 − ∆. 
, and similarlydistributed number of pairs (0, i).
5. Fill in the required number of (0, 0) pairs so that A, B have length precisely n; 6. Randomly permute the letters of A, B (using shared randomness). Proof. We only need to prove this for steps 3 and 4 as the other ones are obvious. Indeed, for i, j ≥ 1:
whereas,
Similarly, for step 5, for i ≥ 1, we have:
We now prove the core of the reduction: that the distribution of (A, B) is close to occurrence vectors of Poi(t) i.i.d. samples from (a, b), such that a = b if x − y 1 = m/2, and similarly, a − b 1 ≥ 1/2 when x − y 1 ≥ m/2 + β. We will prove that, for distribution of (co-)occurrences of large items is nearly same in the two instances; and similarly for the dense items.
We partition the coordinates of (x, y) in the following four groups, each corresponding to either occurrences of dense or large items:
• large: m c = m/4 − ∆ coordinates for each of (1, 1) and (0, 0) coordinate pairs (i.e., coordinates i ∈ [m] where (x i , y i ) = (1, 1) or (x i , y i ) = (0, 0));
• large: m/4 coordinates for each of (1, 0) and (0, 1) pairs;
• dense: ∆ − δ coordinates for each of (1, 1) and (0, 0) pairs;
• dense: δ coordinates for each of (1, 0) and (0, 1) pairs.
Note that this accounts for all coordinates for a pair x, y such that
We now analyze the distribution of occurrences/collisions for each of large and dense items in the generated vectors (A, B), and show that, for each of large/dense items, the distribution is same as if these are occurrences of items coming from distributions a, b defined above. In particular, for, say, large items, we consider the distribution of counts c i,j , where i + j > 0, where c i,j is the number of large items which where sampled i times on Alice's side and j times on the Bob's side; we will refer to them as (i, j) occurrence pairs. We then show that, the distribution of (c i,j ) i+j>0 in (A, B) is Poisson-distributed, whereas, if it were the occurrence pairs vector of samples drawn from a, b, then the distribution is a Multinomial. We then use Theorem 4.4 to conclude that the two distributions are statistically close. Note that the identify of items is not important, as the items are randomly permuted inside the domain, for both A, B as well as in distributions a, b.
Large items in (A, B) . We analyze the large items first. We use the fact that sum of Poisson distributions is again Poisson. For any i, j ∈ {1, . . . k}, the number of large (i, j) pairs is distributed as: , 0) ). Large items in (a, b). Let us now contrast these counts to the one would get from the "real counts" of the large items in the distribution (a, b) defined as above. The latter is a Multinomial (2, 1) , ...). We now can use Theorem 4.4, to conclude that the the TV-distance between M L and the distribution Poi(l · p L ) is bounded by:
01 (by choosing C to be a large enough constant).
Dense items in (A, B) . Let's analyze the distribution of dense items now. For i, j ≥ 1, the distribution of the number of (i, j) dense occurrence pairs is Poi((∆ − δ) · D(i, 0) ) (from the second step). This amounts to: (a, b) . Again, let's compare these counts to the "real counts" that would occur for the distributions (a, b). The latter distribution can be thought of as three distributions: corresponding to items in S A ∩ S B , to items in S A \ S B , and items in S B \ S A . The occurrence counts for items in S 
Dense items in
Summing up with the above, and focusing on (i, 0) pairs, their distribution in (a, b) is at small distance to the distribution where each pair (i, 0) is distributed as:
Thus we conclude that the distribution of occurrence pairs of the dense items in vectors A, B matches, up to a small total variation distance, the distribution for a, b as described above.
This completes the proof of the lower bound.
Closeness Testing: Secure Communication-Efficient Protocols
The protocol from Section 3 is clearly not secure (for example, Bob sends Alice his multi-set S, which reveals information about his input). In this section we show how to modify the protocol to make it secure, relying on standard cryptographic assumptions. Before proceeding, we provide some preliminaries, followed by our general definition for secure computation of distribution testing.
Cryptographic Tools and Preliminaries
We briefly review cryptographic tools and assumptions that we use. We keep the discussion largely informal, and focus on the aspects most relevant to our results. We refer the reader to, e.g., [Gol01, Gol04] for more details and formal definitions of standard primitives.
PRG, OT, and Our Assumptions. A pseudorandom generator (PRG) is a deterministic function G that stretches its input length, such that if the input is selected uniformly at random, the output is indistinguishable from uniform for an appropriate class of distinguishers. In particular, the first cryptographic assumption that our secure protocols rely on, is that there exists a PRG G that can stretch polylog(m) bits to m bits, and fools poly(m)-sized circuits. By default, this is what we mean when we refer to "PRG" in the rest of the paper.
A 1-out-of-m Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol, allows one party holding input i ∈ [m] and another party holding s ∈ {0, 1} m , to engage in a protocol where the first party obtains as output the bit s i , the other party obtains no output, and no further information about s or i is leaked to the parties.
The second cryptographic assumption that our secure protocols rely on, is that there exists a 1-outof-m OT protocol with communication complexity polylog(m). By default, this is what we mean when we refer to "OT" in the rest of the paper.
We note that it is easy to extend a 1-out-of-m OT protocol operating on bits (as we defined above) to one that operates on words of size r (namely, with s ∈ {{0, 1} r } m ), paying a communication overhead that is linear in r. Hence, under our OT assumption, there is such a protocol with communication complexity that is polylogarithmic in m and linear in r.
PRG and OT are both standard cryptographic primitives, that can be instantiated from various concrete number theoretic assumptions. The fact that we require super polynomial stretch for the PRG means that we need to assume subexponential hardness (and this is also the reason that we don't use the OT assumption to generically obtain PRG, as we only need OT with polynomial hardness).
We note that if we wish to weaken the assumptions, we may assume polynomial-stretch PRG (from input of size m δ to output of size m for a constant δ) and sublinear-communication OT (1-out-of-m OT with communication complexity m δ ). Under these weaker assumptions, our secure protocols may incur higher communication complexity, but would still provide meaningful results (and remain secure). Specifically, under a weaker PRG assumption, our protocols would remain sub-linear always and would in fact keep the same complexity for part of the trade-off range. Under a weaker OT assumption, our protocols would remain sub-linear at least for some range of δ and t (the number of samples).
Secure Computation. Intuitively, secure computation allows two or more parties to evaluate some function of their inputs, such that no additional information is revealed to any party (or group of parties) beyond what follows from their own inputs and outputs.
Defining Security: Simulation Paradigm. Secure computation has been studied in many different settings. The idea underlying the security definition in all these settings, is trying to enforce that whatever the adversary can do in the real-world, can also be achieved in an ideal world, where the parties simply give their input to a trusted party, who hands them the output. Defining this formally is complex and various issues arise in different settings.
In this paper we focus on the simplest setting of a semi-honest (or "honest-but-curious") adversary, where the parties follow the protocol faithfully, but try to use their transcripts to glean more information than intended. Our defintions and protocols can be adapted to malicious adversary using standard techniques [GMW86, NN01, Gol04] .
In our setting, if semi-honest Alice and Bob want to compute a function f : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1}, the definition of security boils down to requiring the existence of an efficient simulator for each party, which can simulate the view of the party (their input and transcript), from just the party's input, random input, and output. Modular Composition. At times it is convenient to design a protocol in a modular way, where the computation of a function f may invoke a call to another function g. We will denote by Π g f a protocol computing f , with oracle gates to the function g. A composition theorem [Can00, Gol04] proves that if the protocol Π g f is a secure protocol for f , and Π g is a secure protocol for g, then taking Π g f and replacing the oracle calls to g with an execution of Π g results in a secure protocol Π f for f (which doesn't make any oracle calls).
Feasibility Results. Starting with [Yao82] , a large body of work has shown that any function that can be computed, can be computed securely in various settings. In particular, two parties holding inputs x and y can securely evaluate any circuit C(x, y) with communication O k (|C|) (where k is the security parameter), under mild cryptographic assumptions. Note that this communication complexity is at least linear (since the circuit size is at least as large as the size of input and output), while we will need sublinear communication protocols. Other general techniques for secure function evaluation, where communication does not depend on the circuit size, include fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) ( [Gen09] and follow up work, see [Bra18] for a survey), and homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) [BGI16, BGI17] . However, these transformations still require communication that is linear in the length of input and output (prohibitive in our context). They also require stronger assumptions, and (for FHE) require a high computational overhead, or (for HSS) only apply for restricted classes of circuits. Naor and Nissim [NN01] showed a general way to transform insecure protocols to secure ones, while preserving communication. However, in general this may introduce an exponential blowup in computation, which again will not be sufficient for our needs.
While a naive application of these generic methods doesn't directly work for us, we will make use of another result by Naor and Nissim, adapting secure two party computation techniques to allow for communication-efficient protocols whenever the computation can be expressed as a (small) circuits with (large) ROM.
Secure Circuit with ROM. Consider the setting where each party has a table R ∈ ({0, 1} r ) m (that is, m entries of size r each). Now consider a circuit C that, in addition to usual gates, has lookup gates which allow to access any of the parties' ROM tables (on input i ∈ [m] the gate will return the r-bit record at the requested party's R(i)). Thus, under our OT assumption, a circuit with ROM can be securely evaluated with communication complexity that is linear in |C| and |r|, but polylogarithmic in m. We will rely on this theorem in both of our secure distribution testing constructions. Note that the main remaining challenge is to design the protocol that can be expressed in a form where this theorem can be applied.
Sampling an Orthonormal Matrix. We will use the following fact from [IW06] , proven in the context of providing a secure approximation of the 2 distance.
Theorem 5.2.
[IW06] Suppose we sample a random orthonormal n × n matrix R (from a distribution defined by the Haar measure) but instead generate our randomness using a PRG G, rounding its entries to the nearest multiple of 2 Θ(K) , where K = Θ(k). Then we have for all x ∈ [t] n :
We note that the only place where we use a PRG in our constructions, is in order to be able to apply this theorem (in order to be able to obtain shared randomness with low communication, our parties will share a seed of a PRG that they will expand and use to sample).
Defining Secure Computation for Distribution Testing
Defining security for a distribution testing protocol requires some care, due to two new features that do not come up in the standard setting of secure computation of a function: first, this is "testing" and not "computing", and, second, the function of interest is defined with respect to distributions, but the inputs that the parties use in the computation are samples. Before providing our formal definition, we discuss these issues and our choices.
A testing problem can be described as a partial boolean function g, with the goal of computing g(x) whenever g is defined on the given input x (e.g, when the input consists of two distributions that are either identical or -far). If the input x is such that g(x) is not defined (we will refer to this as an input in the gray zone), the property testing definition (and literature) does not care about whether the output is 0 or 1. Indeed, this flexibility of having a gray zone with no correctness requirement imposed on it is precisely what allows for more efficient testing algorithms.
In contrast, for security purposes, we must care about what the protocol outputs when the input is in the gray zone, as this may reveal information about the inputs. Specifically, standard secure computation notions require that each party learns nothing beyond what follows from their own input and output.
For a protocol testing some property, when the output g(x) is defined, we can (and will) follow this paradigm. When the input is in the gray zone and g is not defined, it is tempting to require that the protocol reveals this fact and no other information about the input. However, it's easy to see that such a protocol in fact is a secure computation of a complete function (where for each input x the protocol outputs whether g(x) = 0, g(x) = 1, or g(x) is undefined). We could instead require that for inputs in the gray zone, the output of the protocol is some distribution over {0, 1}, independent of the input. But such a protocol again is in fact computing some complete function of the input, which intuitively defeats the point of using testing (versus computing) to gain efficiency. This intuition suggests that secure testing of any property (namely, secure computation of a partial function) cannot be achieved with better efficiency than secure computation of a (very related) complete function. We do not attempt to formalize (or refute) this intuition here.
Instead, we show that, for our more special case of secure distribution testing, some information must be leaked in the gray zone, even if one disregards efficiency considerations. Indeed, consider a closeness testing setting where Alice and Bob inputs are t samples from a and b (respectively) over [n] which are either (a, b) = (a 0 , a 0 ), or (a, b) = (a 0 , b ) for some distributions a 0 , b with a 0 − b 1 = . Any correct protocols must have different outputs on such instances with, say, probability 0.99. Now definê a = δ · a + (1 − δ) · a for δ = 0.0001/t, where a is a defined on a new, unique set of letters; Clearly, the distribution of t-sample inputs from (a, b) and (â,b) are the same (for each instance), except with 0.0001 probability, and therefore the distribution over Alice and Bob views (and in particular, the output) in the latter case must be statistically close to the first one, and hence differ with at least 0.98 probability. However (â,b) in both (a 0 , a 0 ) and (a 0 , b ) instances are in the gray zone. It is therefore not possible to simulate Alice's view of Π in any statistically significant manner without additional information (besides the mere fact the distance is in the grey zone).
Following the above, we define a protocol to be a secure computation of a testing task (or partial function) g(x), if it is a secure computation of some (complete, possibly randomized) function f (x), where f (x) = g(x) whenever g(x) is defined; when g(x) is not defined, f (x) is some function of the input x. Thus, each party learns nothing beyond what follows from their own input and the output f (x) (which means there's some leakage f (x) in the gray zone, but no leakage beyond the testing output when the testing promise holds). We will require f to be a boolean function, so that the leakage in the gray zone is at most one bit of information about the input (we will also mention other possible generalizations of this definition). Finally, we note that for distribution testing, the function g is defined on the distributions, but the actual inputs of the parties are samples. This is not a major distinction for correctness, as with sufficiently many samples we can typically obtain the correct result with high probability. However, for security, the leakage f necessarily applies to the samples (our only access to the distributions), and not the distributions themselves.
We are now ready to provide our definition of secure computation of distribution testing.
, and let g : D → {0, 1} be a partial boolean function, defined on a subset P ⊆ D (with g(p) = ⊥ whenever p ∈ D \ P ).
Let π be a d-party protocol, and let k be a security parameter. We say that π is a t-sample secure distribution testing protocol (for the testing task defined by g), if there exists a boolean function f :
such that the following holds: Correctness: for any p ∈ P ,
protocol π is a secure computation of the function f (ζ).
We note that the security condition can be instantiated with any standard secure computation notion. In this paper we focus on the semi-honest model, although malicious security can be obtained by a standard transformation with low communication overhead.
More General Variants of Secure Distribution Testing. The definition can be naturally extended in various ways. We may allow non-boolean f (more bits of leakage), relax the requirement that f = g whenever g is defined (allowing additional leakage even if the promise holds), or impose restrictions on f based on which leakage is deemed more or less reasonable. 2 We may also generalize the scope of distribution testing tasks modeled by the definition (e.g., we may allow one party to get more samples than the other, or give one party a complete description of a distribution rather than samples). For simplicity and ease of exposition, we do not develop these extensions here, and stick with the simpler definition above.
Secure Closeness Testing Protocol
We now describe a secure distribution testing protocol that achieves the same communication complexity as the insecure protocol from Section 3, up to poly-logarithmic factors. Specifically, we show the following theorem:
Theorem 5.4 (Closeness, Secure). Fix a security parameter k > 1. Fix n > 1, ∈ (0, 2), and let t be such that t ≥ C · k · max n 2/3 · −4/3 , √ n · −2 for some (universal) constant C > 0. Then, assuming PRG and OT, there exists a secure distribution testing protocol for 2pCT n,t, which usesÕ k n 2 t 2 4 + 1 communication.
The high level approach is similar to that of the previous protocol, in that we also estimate the squared 2 distance between samples drawn from split distributions a S and b S , for some split-distribution set S, to distinguish between a = b and a − b 1 ≥ . One challenge in securing the protocol is that we would like Alice and Bob to agree on an alphabet (and specifically, use the same split-distribution set S) without compromising their inputs. To address this, Alice and Bob will run a secure computation over a circuit of sizeÕ k, (n 2 /t 2 + 1) which simulates samples from the split distribution instead of communicating the set S.
The main idea is to approximate the distance of the unsplitted occurrences vectors A and B (representing samples drawn from a and b), and "manually" add the difference between the unsplitted and the splitted distance for each i ∈ S. That means, the protocols will:
There is however an issue with this approach: A − B 2 2 might be much larger than A S − B S 2 2 , and therefore the summation of (1) + (2) above might not be a good enough approximation of A S − B S 2 2 . To overcome this issue, we first define the notion of "capped" vectors as follows:
Definition 5.5 (Capped Vectors). For X ∈ R n , we define X ∈ R n to be the 'capped vector of X with threshold L' iff ∀i ∈ [n], X i = min(L, X i ). Now, instead of approximating A − B 2 2 , we will approximate "capped" versions of A, B for some carefully chosen threshold L termed A , B , and show the capped distance is a good-enough approximation to the splitted distance A S − B S 2 2 . Our revised plan is therefore:
Securely Approximating A − B 2 2 . For this task, we will use the techniques of [IW06] . Recall the 2 − Approx protocol from [IW06] samples an orthonormal matrix with rounded entries R as per Theorem 5.2, and samples sufficient coordinates from Rx. To ensure the protocol works correctly, efficiently and securely for all distances, it scans all possible distance magnitudes (termed T ) starting with the largest possible one and dividing by 2 each time, each time with a new circuit. In our case, however, we need only to distinguish if an approximation is more than some threshold, so it suffices to run one ROM sub-circuit with T preselected for such threshold.
Choosing a set S. We also take a slightly different approach for splitting the samples. While in [DK16] and Section 3, we split the distributions using samples from b only, and show it suffices to upper bound the 2 norm for only one of the distributions we test by comparing a and b second moment approximations, here we will upper bound both a S , b S second moments by constructing 2 multisets: S a from a and S b from b and setting S S a S b (where denotes the sum of multiplicities of each element in S a and S b ). While not necessary for correctness, this new technique turns out to both simplify our protocol and improve its security guarantees.
We now show that
Lemma 5.6. Let p be distribution on [n], and let X, Y be the occurrence vectors of t 1 , t 2 samples drawn from p where t 2 ≥ t 1 , then with high probability, we have that for all i ∈ [n], X i ≤ 50 ln(n) · max(1,
Proof. By the Chernoff bound, for each i ∈ [n] we have either:
1. p i ≤ 1/t 1 , and then Pr[X i > 10 ln(n)] ≤ 1/100n 2 ; or 2. p i > 1/t 1 , and then Pr[X i > 10 ln(n)t
so the claim follows the union bound over all coordinates.
Corollary 5.7. Let A, B be the occurrence vectors of t independent samples drawn from each a, b. Let A , B be capped vectors of A, B with threshold L ∈ [t]. Let S a , S b be multisets of independent samples drawn from a, b of size t/L. Finally, for S S a S b , we define A S , B S to be the occurrence vectors of the t samples encoded into A, B, recasted as being drawn from a S , b S . Then, with high probability:
Proof. For each letter i ∈ [n], if both A i and B i are larger than L, then LHS is 0. Hence, we will now assume that B i < L w.l.o.g..
By Lemma 5.6, we have with high probability for all i ∈ [n]:
1. {i multiplicity in S b } ≤ 50 ln(n).
2. {i multiplicity in S a } ≤ 50 ln(n) max(1, A i /L).
Note that on one hand, since B i = B i and A i = min(A i , L) we have
, and on the other hand, we have that
By combining both inequalities we obtain that with high probability, all letters satisfy the equation We define a method for Alice and Bob to prepare a look-up table of simulated samples from split distributions a S and b S for all possible multisets S of size at most t.
Definition 5.8. Given some occurrences vector X ∈ [t] n , we will define the 3D Split Occurrences Matrix X SM ∈ [t] n×t×t as the following random process: for any i ∈ [n], j ∈ [t], we will split X i into j buckets X SM (i, j, 1) , ..., X SM (i, j, j) by recasting each sample to a random bucket uniformly.
We present our protocol next. 2. Let t = t/K; L = max(1,
3. Alice and Bob exchange the seed of the PRG G, and generate matrix R as in Theorem 5.2.
4. Alice partitions the t samples into K Sample Sets of t samples each, and for each Sample Set prepares ROM entries RA , A SM , M a , X Sa as follows:
(a) Generate multi-set S a using t /2L samples from the Sample Set according to Lemma 2.3. 6. Alice and Bob run a secure circuit with ROM, C Π to compute the following function.
(a) For each of the sample sets j ∈ [K]: 
Protocol analysis
We now prove Theorem 5.4 on the correctness and security of the protocol Π.
From now on we assume all the above. According to Lemma 3.2 and Fact 2.2, all we need to make the test successful with high probability is O( L/t · n/ 2 ) = O(t /c + n/ √ t 2 ) = O(t /c + n 2/3 / 4/3 ) many samples (since t ≥ O(n 2/3 −4/3 ). By choosing c to be high enough constant, t /2 samples suffice to make the vote correct with high probability. Therefore majority vote over K sample sets amplify such probability to 1 − neg(k).
We'll now show Π is a secure computation for f (ζ) for any ζ. For correctness, we'll show that for all ζ, E[Π(ζ)] − E[f (ζ)] = neg(k). This is sufficient, since both Π and f provide an output in {0, 1} (so the output expectation is the same as the probability the output equals 1). We'll first show that for all sample sets ζ 1 , . . . , ζ K :
Lemma 5.9. Let A S , B S denote the occurrences vector of simulated samples from a S , b S respectively, then we have for all sample sets
Proof. For any i ∈ [n], let m i = 1 + {i multiplicity in S}. We have either:
and then:
(c) i does not contribute to O j .
(ii) i ∈ M a ∪ M b , and then:
− (A i − B i ) 2 , and
Therefore, each i contribution to LHS and RHS are equivalent. This concludes the proof.
So we are left to show that Pr[
If we have A − B 2 > T , then both events occurring with prob. 1 − neg(k). Otherwise, we use Theorem 5.2 and obtain that:
Therefore, by linearity of expectations and the union bound we obtain that the distribution over the z i differ by at most neg(k) between f (ζ) and Π(ζ), and therefore the probability to output 0 differ by at most neg(k).
Next, we show that the protocol Π is a secure computation of f . We note that the only communication in the protocol is sending is the random seed, followed by the secure circuit computation of the final output, which is indistinguishable from f (ζ). Moreover, as described above, either Pr[f (ζ) = Π(ζ)] ≥ 1 − neg(k) or the distribution over the z i (for a given seed) differ by at most neg(k). Thus, replacing the secure circuit C Π with an oracle computing the output, the simulator (for either Alice or for Bob) outputs its input, a random seed for G, and the final output, to generate a distribution that is statistically close to that in the real-world.
Finally, we analyze the communication complexity of the protocol Π for 2pCT. To analyze the circuit size of C Π , one can observe that:
• Computing O j can be done with a circuit of sizeÕ(|M a | + |M b |) =Õ(t /L) =Õ( n 2 4 ·t 2 + 1) (by computing each y i in step 6(a)i usingÕ(1) computations).
• Next, computing D j (with O j as input) can be done with a circuit of sizeÕ(l) =Õ k (log
t 2 4 + 1).
• Computing majority over K (sub-)circuits adds multiplicative factor of Θ(k) to the circuit size.
Thus C Π is of sizeÕ k n 2 t 2 4 + 1 , and the ROM consists of s poly(n, t, 1/ , k) words of size r Õ (1) each. Therefore, the communication complexity of the secure computation of C Π is |C Π | · T (r, s), where T (r, s) is is the communication complexity of 1-out-of-s OT on words of size r. Finally, the total communication of the protocol Π additionally also includes the length of the seed for G.
Plugging in our OT and PRG assumptions, we obtain the required communication bound (using Theorem 5.1).
Independence Testing: Communication and Security
In this section, we present our protocol for independence testing. To streamline the presentation, we give directly a secure protocol, noting that obtaining communication-efficiency is the main challenge for this problem. Overall, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6.1 (Independence, Secure). Fix a security parameter k > 1. Fix ∈ (0, 2), 1 ≤ m ≤ n, and let t be such that t ≥ C · k · n 2/3 m 1/3 −4/3 + √ nm/ 2 , for some (universal) constant C > 0, and assuming OT cryptographic assumption, there is a secure distribution testing protocol for 2pIT n,m,t, Note that similarly to 2pCT, our protocol for 2pIT obtains better communication than via the straight-forward approach of Alice sending its input to Bob, and Bob invoking standard independence testing algorithm. We show a matching lower bound on communication for t → ∞ in Section 7.
We start by providing some intuition behind our protocol, setting up some definitions along the way. As before, our protocol for 2pIT uses the framework of splitting the distributions to reduce the problem to testing an 2 distance. While it may seem tempting to reuse the sketching technique to estimate the 2 distance between the joint distribution and the product of its marginals, this technique does not help here as this distance cannot be approximated without first combining the samples from Alice and Bob. To overcome this inherent obstacle, we use an alphabet reduction technique. At a high level, our reduction samples a random rectangle R of the underlying split distribution alphabet, and tests its distance to the marginal product distribution. This concept helps us to improve communication in two ways. First, we obtain better communication as we need to deal with a smaller alphabet problem, and, second, we can use the additional samples for tighter 2 bound on the smaller alphabet product distribution. Each of these two improvements achieve linear improvement with more samples and therefore we hope for a quadratic improvement overall. The latter improvement is only effective while t n samples, and hence the quadratic improvement kicks in only in that regime.
To formalize the alphabet-reduction idea, we start by making the following definition:
Definition 6.2. Fix some distribution p over alphabet [n] . For U ⊆ [n] let p |U be the distribution p conditioned on the set U: i.e., p |U is a distribution over alphabet U such that for any i ∈ U, p |U (j) = p(j)/ i∈U p(i).
Given joint distribution p = (a, b), let S a , S b be the multisets in [n], [m] of samples from a, b respectively. Define the multiset S ⊂ [n]×[m] to be such that 1+{multiplicity of (i, j) in S} = (1+{multiplicity of i in S a }) · (1 + {multiplicity of j in S b }).
Our idea is to sample a rectangle
, and test the closeness of the sub-distributionsp
We would like R to satisfy the following properties:
1. If a is independent of b, denoted a ⊥ ⊥ b, thenp =q, and if a and b are -far from being independent, thenp is at distance Ω( ) fromq.
Pr i∼p
is high enough, so that we have sufficient samples to testp andq for closeness.
3. R is sufficiently small to allow small communication.
4. The secure circuit can simulate samples fromp,q usingÕ(1) ROM look-ups per sample.
We obtain conditions (1) and (2) above by bounding the 2 norm of the underlying product distribution through splitting, and use such bound also as a bound over the variance of the 1 mass ofp and its distance fromq. We analyze such approach in Section 6. In order to be able to look-up and "pair" Alice and Bob samples from some rectangle R, we need a method for storing a table of all indices for each letter. For this, we use the following definition: Definition 6.3. Given t indexed samples X ∈ [n] t , we define the Indices Set Vector I ∈ (2 [t] ) n such that I(j) = {i ∈ [t] : X i = j}.
Full protocol description
In contrast to closeness testing, the main challenge for the 2pIT problem is designing a communicationefficient protocol, while adding security introduces relatively minor nuances. Hence, for ease of exposition, we present the secure version of our protocol directly.
Our overall protocol proceeds as follows at a high level. Alice and Bob first generate multi-sets S a , S b . Alice then simulates one set of indexed samples from a Sa (termed A) while Bob simulates two sets of samples from b S b . First set (termed B p ) is obtained using the sample set corresponding to the set A, and the second one using a fresh independent sample set (termed B q ). Alice then prepares Indices Set Vector I of A. Next, a secure circuit with ROM samples a uniform subset U from [n + |S a |], looks up all of Alice's samples coming from U, and generates 2 joint sample sets: the first one by pairing each of Alice's samples A with the corresponding sample in B p (thereby simulating samples fromp as defined above), and then by pairing each of Alice's samples A with an independent sample from B q (thereby simulating samples fromq). Finally, those two sets are then being tested (directly) for closeness using Lemma 3.2.
We note that the set U, together with the protocol's output can possibly compromise Bob's data, and therefore we need the secure circuit to compute U (rather than Alice providing it to the circuit). One challenge with such approach though, is the set U may be larger than the communication bound. Luckily, we only care about non-empty letters in U which are (in expectation) of small size, and since we sample U uniformly from [n + |S a |], we can overcome the issue by sampling the non-empty letters of U from the non-empty letters of [n + |S a |] (e.g. appears at least once in A). For this we need to define a distribution over the size of intersection of subsets chosen uniformly: Definition 6.4. For n ≥ 1, and α, β ≤ n, we define a discrete distribution called Uniform Subset Intersection distribution µ(n, α, β) as follows: Fix S to be a set of size n, and S 1 ⊆ S of size α. Then µ(n, α, β) ∆ ≡ |S 1 ∩ S 2 |, where S 2 ⊆ S of size β is chosen uniformly at random.
Claim 6.5. Let S be a finite set of size n ≥ 1, and let S 1 ⊆ S of size α. Let S 2 be a uniform subset of S of size β. Finally, let S 3 be uniform subset of S 1 of size µ(n, α, β). Then S 3 ≡ S 1 ∩ S 2 .
Proof. One observe that |S 3 | = µ(n, α, β) ≡ |S 1 ∩ S 2 | by our definition of µ. Furthermore, since S 2 was chosen uniformly at random, then each element of S 1 has equal and independent probability to be part of S 1 ∩ S 2 , and therefore S 1 ∩ S 2 is also a uniform subset of S 1 .
We now present our protocol for 2pIT. As before, our protocol uses a secure circuit with ROM which will sample from Alice and Bob's input strings. Proof. We obtain (1) immediately from the fact p 1|U and p 2 are the marginals ofp.
For i ∈ [n], let ∆ i = p(i, * ) − p 2 1 , where p(i, * ) is the right-marginal of p conditioned on p 1 = i. Since p(i, j) = p(i, * )(j) · p 1 (i), we have that p 1 , ∆ = p − p 1 × p 2 1 . If p is -far from the product distribution, then p 1 , ∆ ≥ . We now invoke Lemma 6.8 using p = p 1 , and get that with 0.9 probability: p |U ×[m] − p 1|U × p 2 1 = i∈U p 1 (i) · ∆ i i∈U p 1 (i)
= Ω( ).
Analysis of the protocol
Proof of Theorem 6.1. The proof proceeds in the following steps:
1. First we define a boolean function f (ζ).
2. We show that for p = (a, b) such that a ⊥ ⊥ b or p is -far from any product distribution, the function f (ζ) = g(p), whenever ζ ∼ i.i.d p except with negligible probability.
3. Finally, we show that the protocol Π is a secure computation of f (ζ).
For f (ζ), we define f to be the boolean function producing a bit by simulating steps (1), . . . , (5) of Π(ζ) by Alice and Bob. Indeed, such simplification is possible for 2pIT since the protocol involves no communication outside of the secure circuit computation.
We now show that, whenever a ⊥ ⊥ b or p is -far from any product distribution, we obtain Pr ζ 1 ...ζt∼ i.i.d. p [f (ζ) = g(p)] = 1 − neg(k). We prove for each i ∈ {0, . . . , K − 1}, all the below happen with some high constant probability:
1. X i 1 , X i 2 are distributed as being drawn fromp and Y i 1 , Y i 2 are distributed as being drawn fromq.
2.p =q if a ⊥ ⊥ b and p −q 1 ≥ if (a, b) are -far from the product distribution.
3. X i 1 , Y i 1 contain sufficiently many samples to approximate p 2 , q 2 , and X i 2 and Y i 2 contain sufficiently many samples to test the closeness ofp andq according to Lemma 3.2.
For (1), we note that |Γ i | ≤ t and therefore E[µ(n+|S a |, |Γ i |, l)] ≤ t ·l/n and we have λ = µ(n+|S a |, |Γ i |, l) with 0.99 probability (by Markov). According to Claim 6.5, the process in which the circuit samples U from Γ i simulates the process of sampling U of size l uniformly from [n + |S a |] with U ≡ Γ i ∩ U, and therefore X i and Y i are distributed as being drawn fromp andq.
We obtain (2) with 0.9 probability immediately from Lemma 6.9.
For (3), let us denote t MIN to be the samples required both to meet the conditions of Lemma 3.2, and to produce a constant factor approximation for p 2 and q 2 . Let us also denote t REAL to be the actual samples our protocol produces fromp,q in steps 5. And therefore:
On the other hand we have by Lemma 6.7 with probability 0.95:
As a result, there exists some constant c for which we obtain t REAL ≥ t MIN with probability 0.95 − o(1) whenever l ≥ cn 3 m t 2 γ 4 = c · max{ n 3 ·m t 3 4 , n 2 ·m t 2 4 }. We note as well that ∆ i is an exact computation of X − Y 2 2 and therefore can also be considered (1 + α) approximation of such quantity (for any α).
Last, we need to show l is properly defined, and in particular, l ≤ n + |S a |. Note that from the conditions of Theorem 6.1, t ≥ C · O( √ nm/ 2 ). We thus set C to be a large enough constant such that l ≤ n holds.
To sum up, we have shown (by the union bound) that for each i ∈ {0, . . . , K − 1}, the conditions of Lemma 3.2 are met with probability 0.85 − o(1), and therefore f (ζ) votes correctly with probability 1/2 + Ω(1). The final majority output over K votes is therefore correct with 1 − neg(k) probability as needed.
We'll now show Π is a secure computation for f (ζ) for any ζ. For correctness, we need show that for all ζ, E[Π(ζ)] − E[f (ζ)] = neg(k). In fact, those are equal by our definition of f above.
Security follows immediately from the security of the secure circuit with ROM, as there is no additional communication or randomness in the protocol.
We now analyze the communication complexity of Π. We note all communication is invoked from the secure circuit in step (5) above. For each of the K (sub-)circuits producing a vote, the circuit first makes O(1) look-ups for each letter in U . The circuit then calculates the number of corresponding sample indices in I i and samples O(t l/n) such indices. One can observe that such sampling process is possible using a circuit of size O(t l/n) even with the (low-probability) scenario where there are ω(t l/n) such indices since the index sets are disjoint. For each sampled index (in I i p , I i q , J i p , J i q ), the circuit invokesÕ(1) calculations to produce collision count and occurrence vector squared distance. Therefore, the circuit size is bounded byÕ(λ + t l/n) =Õ(t l/n) =Õ 
Independence Testing: Communication Lower Bound
We now show our lower bounds for 2pIT. We show that any one-way protocol requires Ω( √ m) bits of communication (regardless of the security properties).
The lower bound result is obtained by reduction from the Boolean Hidden Hypermatching (BHH) problem from [VY11] . In the BHH problem, Alice is given x ∈ {0, 1} n , and Bob is given some complete matching M of [n] such that for all pairs (i, j) in the matching: i ⊕ j = b ∈ {0, 1}. Bob's goal to output b correctly with 2/3 probability. For this problem, [VY11] show that one-way communication complexity is Ω( √ n).
Using the above result, we now show the following:
Theorem 7.1. For n, t ∈ N, any one-way protocol for 2pIT n,n,t,1,1/3 requires Ω( √ n) bits of communication.
